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Best of both worlds
Eleni Diamanti and Elham Kashefi
Secure communication is emerging as a significant challenge for our hyper-connected data-dependent 
society. The answer may lie in a clever combination of quantum and classical cryptographic techniques.
Edward Snowden’s revelations on the mass surveillance practices in the US and UK brought to the forefront 
the issues of privacy and security of data 
and communications. In an increasingly 
connected world, the words ‘big data’ and 
‘cloud technologies’ have left the vocabulary 
of technology experts to reach mainstream 
culture and become the very centre of the 
emerging digital transformation of services 
and applications. Ensuring privacy and 
security is now an imperative. At the same 
time, it poses a formidable challenge — one 
that may be best served by a hybrid quantum 
and classical approach.
Indeed, addressing this challenge 
in the coming years will undoubtedly 
require pushing the boundaries of current 
cryptographic techniques, which typically 
rely on the difficulty of certain mathematical 
operations, to include techniques enabled 
by the fundamental laws of quantum 
physics. Well-established quantum 
algorithms and protocols allow, for example, 
for exponentially faster factorization, 
or the distribution of secret keys with 
unconditional security — impossible tasks 
using only classical resources.
The far-reaching potential of quantum 
technologies has led the NSA and NIST to 
initiate a transition to quantum-resistant 
cryptographic algorithms. Google and 
Microsoft have launched dedicated 
laboratories for studying applications of 
quantum computing to machine learning 
and other fields. And IBM has made 
the use of its quantum platform freely 
accessible in a cloud network setting. 
Major efforts are also underway in the 
EU with a continent-scale investment, 
and in China with the development of a 
2,000 km quantum network — the common 
vision being to accelerate innovation and 
technology transfer. But what do these rapid 
developments mean for new cryptography 
functionalities that use the best of the 
classical and quantum worlds?
Classical progress
Let’s start on the classical side. With ever-
increasing numbers of miniature computing 
mobile devices and powerful central servers, 
the traditional view of cryptography as the 
art of passing secret messages from point to 
point has evolved to secure outsourced data 
processing. Can we compute with encrypted 
data without decrypting them first? This is 
the key concept behind modern cryptography 
protocols leading to functionalities such as 
multiparty secure computation, delegated 
computing, verification of outsourced data 
manipulation and differential privacy in 
emerging platforms such as cloud services.
The stack of protocols for basic 
functionalities, such as public and 
symmetric encryption, message passing 
and authentication, are already running 
as the building blocks of the Internet. 
However, these new functionalities are 
still under development. And although the 
race is on between all the information and 
communication technology stakeholders, 
and progress is being made with significant 
speed, practical solutions compatible with 
fast, day-to-day processing of big data still 
remain a challenge.
Moreover, should advances in 
quantum technologies succeed in building 
powerful devices capable of breaking the 
computational assumptions behind these 
classical protocols, both traditional and 
modern protocols would be under the 
threat of a security breach. For example, 
Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm would 
compromise the widely used RSA scheme1. 
In response to this threat, the field of 
post-quantum cryptography has emerged 
in recent years. The aim is to develop 
cryptographic primitives that remain 
secure even against quantum computers, 
by exploiting properties of error-correcting 
codes or lattice-based hard problems2. This 
line of research has put forward a new trade-
off between the desired level of security and 
the required efficiency for practical purposes 
currently explored by Google’s New Hope 
scheme in Chrome. But while cryptographers 
search for new computational assumptions 
that provide resistance to quantum attacks, 
crypto-analysts are busy finding new 
quantum trickery to break them down3. This 
in turn leads to the need for more complex 
protocols and hence to even more challenges 
for practical solutions.
Quantum developments
Quantum key distribution (QKD) — 
the quantum cryptographic scheme that 
enables unconditionally secure message 
exchange — is arguably a milestone in 
the quantum information field. QKD 
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promises future-proof security: it is resilient 
against future technological developments 
that may threaten the integrity of the 
secret information, including powerful 
quantum devices, and has seen tremendous 
developments in recent years. The quantum 
cryptography toolbox, however, is much 
broader4. It includes protocols in various 
security models and settings with respect to 
user trust, device complexity and power, for 
which a rigorous quantum advantage can be 
shown in practice.
In parallel, although a universal quantum 
computer may still be some decades in 
the future, it is now possible to prepare, 
manipulate and precisely control systems 
involving a few quantum information 
bits (qubits) encoded in systems such as 
superconducting circuits, cold atoms, ions, 
photons, and nitrogen–vacancy centres in 
diamond. The first elements of universal 
quantum computations and quantum error 
correction have been demonstrated in these 
systems, as well as the nonlocal character 
of quantum mechanics, which opens the 
door to so-called device-independent 
implementations — free from security 
threats due to practical imperfections.
The main challenge now is to move 
towards large-scale systems and networks, 
where the true disruptive potential of 
quantum technologies can be shown. This 
requires the development of practical, 
scalable resources as building blocks and 
of adapted multiparty communication 
and distributed computation protocols 
performed between (potentially malicious) 
clients and servers. As an example, blind 
quantum computing opens the way to the 
verification of a complex computation 
performed by an assumed quantum, all 
powerful, untrusted server by clients 
equipped with only limited resources5,6.
With the current rate of progress in 
quantum technologies, we can clearly 
foresee the first 50-qubit systems appearing 
within the next decade. However, despite 
this progress, the concrete applications of 
quantum cryptography still occupy a niche 
in practical information and communication 
technologies, and the demonstration of the 
full extent of the quantum superiority in a 
large-scale system or network is extremely 
challenging due to the high cost of the 
associated error correction schemes. While 
recent breakthroughs in the design of new 
codes7,8 are a promising route to overcome 
this apparent bottleneck, we could, in the 
meantime, explore the noisy qubits directly 
to enhance classical schemes.
Going hybrid
In order to do so, we believe in adopting 
a vision that combines the advantages of 
classical and quantum algorithms and 
technologies. The first step is to realize 
that we need both: the classical world 
offers solid mathematical foundations and 
easiness of implementation based on widely 
deployed infrastructures. The quantum 
world provides the means to enhance the 
security and efficiency of cryptographic 
techniques to render them unbreakable by 
future technologies. At this point, we are able 
to verify, certify and program today’s small 
quantum devices so that we can effectively 
exploit tomorrow’s scalable machines.
A concrete platform illustrating how this 
can be put into place is the evolution towards 
a hybrid quantum-safe infrastructure. 
And we are already seeing various threads 
of such developments in the field. One 
straightforward hybrid approach involves 
employing a quantum cryptography protocol 
such as QKD as a subroutine within classical 
infrastructures, as was demonstrated in the 
Swiss elections in 2007. In doing so, the 
eventual success is dictated by a detailed 
performance analysis, taking into account 
the realistic cost of the required quantum 
hardware versus the obtained added value. 
This issue of the price of trust is even more 
critical when the added quantum primitives 
do not necessarily provide unconditional 
security, but only better than classical, as is 
the case for quantum bit commitment9, coin 
flipping10,11 and digital signatures12,13.
Recently the opposite direction has also 
been proposed, in which classical primitives 
such as one-time memory, secure multiparty 
computing, or fully homomorphic encryption 
are put in use to obtain new quantum 
functionalities14–16. These new protocols will 
be needed in a not-too-distant future where 
quantum servers will provide computing 
services along with classical devices in 
a distributed network with potentially 
malicious parties in place. More broadly, the 
development of quantum functionalities such 
as multiparty quantum computation and 
secret sharing17,18 is desirable.
A less conventional hybrid scheme has 
been also explored in recent years, which 
combines elements of classical computing 
(such as linear functions) with minimal 
quantum effects (like contextuality) to derive 
a new computing platform19 that may also 
provide better-than-classical security in 
specific scenarios20,21.
Exploring a framework where the 
aforementioned quantum and classical 
primitives can be securely combined is one 
of the key challenges upon which researchers 
from both classical and quantum domains 
have recently embarked22,23. Taking into 
account realistic implementation constrains 
such as bounded or noisy storage24,25 
and relativistic constrains26,27 is another 
promising route towards obtaining practical 
solutions implementable with currently 
available quantum technology.
The roadmap to obtaining a realistic 
hybrid quantum–classical secure computing 
and communication platform is clear. First, 
we need to develop classical protocols for 
multiparty computing, verification and 
delegation that are secure against quantum 
attacks. In doing so, we need to establish 
the efficiency and security bottlenecks 
associated with these novel post-quantum 
functionalities. The next challenge is to 
design quantum subroutine protocols 
for these bottlenecks within the classical 
schemes. And finally, we need to develop 
purpose-built devices implementing these 
quantum protocols and taking into account 
low-cost and flexibility criteria amenable 
to an ultimate industrial exploitation. Stay 
tuned for configurable quantum USB keys. ❐
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